State v. Jackson Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 36968 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-22-2010
State v. Jackson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36968
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Jackson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36968" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1231.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1231
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PONY L. JACKSON, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 36968 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CLARK 
HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 7259 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3 
The State Violated Mr. Jackson's Right To A Fair Trial By 
Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct ............................................................. 3 
A. The Standard Articulated in State v. Perry ................................................. 3 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court Explicitly Held That The New 
Standard Of Review Is Not Retroactive And, Therefore, 
The New Standard Articulated In The Perry Decision 
Does Not Apply ..................................................................................... 3 
2. Assuming Arguendo Perry Applies ....................................................... 4 
B. The Prosecutor's Comments Which Mr. Jackson Asserts 
Were An Impermissible Comment On Silence And 
Appealed To The Passions And Prejudices Of The 
Jury Were Not Ambiguous, But Clearly Offered For An 
Improper Purpose ...................................................................................... 5 
C. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Violating A District 
Court Order ........................................................................................ 7 
CONCLUSiON ...................................................................................................... 9 
CERTIFIC"JE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) ........................................................ 3 
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,825 P.2d 1073 (1991) ....................................... 4 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) ............................................................ .4 
Perry, 2010 WL 2880156, p.16, _ Idaho at _, _ P.3d at _ ............................. 4 
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 233p.3d 61 (2010) ......................................... 3 
State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,236 P.3d 1269 (2010) ................................... .4 
State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 WL 2880156, p.15, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d 
_ (July 23, 201 0) ......................................................................................... 3, 4 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ................................................................... 4 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pony Jackson asserts that the State violated his right to a fair trial by committing 
prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Jackson had 
a fair trial not by submitting only competent, admissible evidence to the jury, but instead 
commented that Mr. Jackson failed to present evidence of his innocence, encroached 
upon the province of the jury by denying them of their right to be the ultimate judges of 
the credibility of the witnesses, blatantly disregarded the district court's order prohibiting 
the use of overly prejudicial evidence, and appealed to the passions and prejudices of 
the jury asking that they not punish the alleged victim. Mr. Jackson contends that the 
misconduct committed in his case constituted fundamental error and was not harmless. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that the standards 
articulated in State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 WL 2880156, _ Idaho _, _ 
P.3d _ (July 23, 2010) (reh'g pending), apply in this case; that prosecutorial 
misconduct related to vouching does not implicate a constitutional right; that statements 
by the prosecutor, made for an obviously improper purpose, where presented for 
another purpose; and that the State did not violate a district court order. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Jackson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the State violate Mr. Jackson's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The State Violated Mr. Jackson's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
A. The Standard Articulated In State v. Perry 
State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 WL 2880156, p.15, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d 
_ (July 23, 2010) (reh'g pending) holds that unobjected to errors will be reviewed if the 
defendant demonstrates that his unwaived constitutional right was plainly violated. The 
three-prong inquiry requires the defendant to demonstrate that the alleged error: 
U(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly 
exists; and (3) was not harmless." Id. p.17. The defendant must prove that the error 
was not harmless by demonstrating "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial." Id. at 16. 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court Explicitly Held That The New Standard Of 
Review Is Not Retroactive And; Therefore, The New Standard Articulated 
In The Perry Decision Does Not Apply 
The Court stated, U[t]his restatement shall not be given retroactive application" 
and cited to the holding in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 292 (2008), for the 
proposition that State courts were free to develop their own rules of retroactivity. Perry, 
2010 WL 2880156, p.8, _ Idaho at _, _ P.3d at _. This Court adopted the Teague1 
standard to resolve retroactive application to those cases on collateral review. 
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010). In Rhoades, this Court 
recognized the valid distinction of cases pending on direct review and those that were 
final before the issuance of the new law. Id. Recently, this Court recognized the United 
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States Supreme court precedent holding that a new rule should be applied to all cases 
still pending on direct review. State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,515,236 P.3d 1269, 
1275 (2010) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)). However, the rules of 
retroactive and prospective application generally only apply to a rule of "constitutional 
dimension." Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,420-21, 825 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (1991) 
(Bistline, Justice, dissenting). 
In Perry, this Court did not hold that the new standard of review is one of 
constitutional dimension. Perry, 2010 WL 2880156, p.16, _ Idaho at _, _ P.3d at_. 
Additionally, the Court held that the new standard is not retroactive. When the Court 
made no other clarification or limitation on the non-retroactive holding, the plain 
language of Perry requires the application to only be applied prospectively and, 
therefore, inapplicable to those trials occurring prior to the Remittitur being issued in the 
Perry Opinion. Therefore, by the plain language of the Perry decision, the new standard 
of review is not applicable to this case because Mr. Jackson's trial occurred before the 
Perry opinion became final. 
2. Assuming Arguendo Perry Applies 
The errors in this case relate directly to Mr. Jackson's unwaived constitutional 
rights. First, it is a violation of Mr. Jackson's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial 
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial 
and the law as explained in the jury instructions. Id. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, 
in general, directly violates a constitutional right. In this case, misconduct related to 
vouching and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury also interfered with 
1 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
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the jury's ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Jackson's 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Further, the misconduct relating to 
Mr. Jackson's failure to prove his innocence, in a case where only Mr. Jackson and the 
alleged victim can testify about the alleged incidents, amounts to a comment on silence 
and is a violation of Mr. Jackson's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. As such, the 
misconduct in this case clearly violates Mr. Jackson's unwaived constitutional rights. 
The error in this case plainly exists from the record and no additional information 
is necessary. It cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury 
reach a verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible 
grounds presented through misconduct. 
Additionally, the errors are not harmless. The harmless error standard and 
arguments in support were articulated in section E of the Appellant's Brief and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
Therefore, under the new standard articulated in Perry, the prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case is fundamental and .. requires that his case be remanded for a 
new trial. 
B. The Prosecutor's Comments Which Mr. Jackson Asserts Were An Impermissible 
Comment On Silence And Appealed To The Passions And Prejudices Of The 
JUry Were Not Ambiguous, But Clearly Offered For An Improper Purpose 
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: "Did we hear any testimony that 
it didn't happen? I don't recall hearing any testimony that it didn't happen. The only 
testimony I recall was that it happened." (Tr., p.356, Ls.12-15.) The State has argued 
that the prosecutor's statement was "at best, ambiguous" and that ambiguous argument 
cannot constitute misconduct. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-S.) Mr. Perry asserts that 
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above comment is not at all ambiguous. Had the prosecutor wished to comment on an 
officer's testimony about Mr. Jackson's statements during the investigation, as the State 
suggests, he could have done so. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-9.) However, that is 
plainly not what the prosecutor is discussing. The prosecutor used the term "any 
testimony" twice. While the State might like to argue to this Court that "any" means a 
single specific piece of testimony, it means "any." The plain meaning of the statement 
directly implies that Mr. Jackson did not present any evidence of his innocence, which is 
an impermissible comment on silence. As such, the statement is not ambiguous. 
The State also made a similar argument in regards to the prosecutor's statement, 
"And she ought not to be held or punished again for waiting to come forward." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-13; Tr., p. 342, Ls.1-2.) Again, the State asserts that the 
statement was "at best, ambiguous" and that ambiguous argument cannot constitute 
misconduct. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.) The prosecutor could have made the 
statement that just because there was a delay in reporting, it does not mean that she is 
not credible. However, the prosecutor did not make this statement. And, contrary to the 
State's assertion, using the words "she ought not be held or punished again" does 
transform what could have been a legitimate argument into a constitutional violation. 
The plain and unambiguous purpose of this statement was to request that the jury find 
the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim. Such a comment is misconduct and 
deprived Mr. Jackson of his constitutional right to an impartial jury and a fair trial. 
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C. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Violating A District Court Order 
The State asserts that, "[t]he prosecutor never mentioned nor solicited evidence 
in violation of the court's order." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) The following is the 
discussion surrounding, and the district court's order, on this issue: 
MR. SIMPSON (Prosecutor): Okay. The other issue I've got is, 
Kendra Ward, she is now 21. This happened when she was four years 
old. The way this came about is, is that a couple of years ago, in 2007, 
she was watching the news and Pony Jackson had been arrested for child 
pornography and the news said if anyone out there has been molested by 
Pony Jackson, would you please contact the law enforcement. I mean, 
that's kind of my paraphrasing of it. 
And so my question is, is I'm sure Todd's [defense counsel] is 
going to object if that - to that kind of information coming in; and I just - I 
want to know the boundaries of this. Again, I don't want any mistrials or 
appealable issues. Do you want me to avoid that issue unless Todd 
raises it? I mean, I think I can get - I think I can say, "Did you contact law 
enforcement and for what reason did you contact law enforcement," 
without getting into the -
THE COURT: Right. If you can, I mean, that's going to be much 
better. It's going to be problematic if she's - if this evidence of 
charges for child pornography come in because that can be unfairly 
prejudicial. I mean, certainly she can testify that she became aware that 
he was involved. Well-
MR. SIMPSON: Yeah. I mean, how do we - how does the jury 
understand that all of a sudden she - because I think part of Todd's 
defense is that why wait all this time and then all of a sudden you do it. So 
howdo 1-
THE COURT: Well, she can testify - and this may take some 
coaching on your part so we don't get into a problem - but that she 
saw a report about Pony Jackson and -
MR. SIMPSON: But don't mention it was on child pornography; she 
saw a report? 
THE COURT: Yeah, it wasn't based on child pornography 
issues but that he was involved - that was - that he was involved -
there was a law enforcement inquiry regarding Pony Jackson and 
that prompted her to come forward, something general and 
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innocuous like that. Certainly she can talk about this was generated 
by a law enforcement inquiry; but if she can stay away from the 
charges, we're going to be a lot better off. 
MR. SIMPSON: Okay. I think I can coach her on that. I talked to 
her about that yesterday too. And, of course, a lot of that depends on 
what you ask her on cross-examination, what I can get into, I'm assuming, 
after that. But that's the way - those are my -
THE COURT: So, I mean, that - the evidence of prior crimes and 
prior acts can come in if the door gets opened on that. But, I mean, right 
now that - you want to treat that as being unfairly prejudicial, the 
prejudice doesn't outweigh the probative value. But if there's a door 
gets [sic] opened, then that does come in. 
(Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.36, L.1 (emphasis added).) 
Mr. Jackson concedes that the district court did not specifically state that the 
prosecution could not have witnesses claim that the television report was about 
Mr. Jackson molesting children. However, the prosecution was ordered to solicit only 
information that the alleged victim reported the offense because of a "law enforcement 
inquiry" and to "stay away from the charges." The district court also noted that the 
prosecutor should coach his witnesses to say only "something general and innocuous." 
Repeated references to the molestation of others are not innocuous and were prohibited 
at the heart of the order. The State's argument that solicitation of even more prejudicial 
answers is not a violation of the order is without merit. The intention of the district court 
was abundantly clear and the prosecution's distortion of the order for the purpose of 
admitting overly prejudicial evidence is misconduct and shows complete malevolence 
on the part of the prosecutor. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2010. 
ELIZABETH ANN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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